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INTRODUCTION 
Establishing a federal pleading standard is a high-stakes game for both 
courts and prospective litigants.  If the standard is too stringent, then courts 
risk throwing out potentially meritorious claims and denying injured plain-
 
*  J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2011; B.A., Williams College, 2003.  I 
would like to thank Professors Martin H. Redish and Lee Epstein for their invaluable guidance on earlier 
drafts of this Note.  Many thanks also to Jonathan Shaub, Christina Chan, Jessica Bevis, and Mark 
Berghausen for their helpful suggestions and editorial guidance. 
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tiffs any opportunity to be compensated for their losses.  If the standard is 
too lenient, courts risk being overloaded with frivolous lawsuits that expose 
potentially innocent defendants to costly and burdensome discovery.   
Defining the contours of the pleading standard implicates policy con-
siderations and values at the core of our procedural system.  When the mer-
its of a complaint are unclear, do we err on the side of judicial accuracy by 
allowing all plaintiffs the opportunity to uncover evidence in support of 
their claims?  Or do we err on the side of judicial efficiency and dismiss the 
claim?   
The Supreme Court threw federal pleading doctrine into flux with its 
seminal decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.1  After officially “re-
tir[ing]”2 the prevailing “no set of facts” standard for analyzing the factual 
sufficiency of a complaint,3 the Court instituted a new requirement that a 
complaint state “a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”4  Because the 
Court did not provide a concrete definition of “plausibility,” however, 
lower courts and scholars were confused regarding the intended scope and 
content of the new standard.5  
The Supreme Court recently attempted to clean up the Twombly mess 
by revisiting the issue of general federal pleading standards in Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal.6  This Note conducts an empirical analysis to study whether the Court 
has finally succeeded in creating a workable pleading standard that can be 
applied uniformly across the circuits.  This analysis first tracks whether 
lower courts have cited the two-pronged analytical approach suggested by 
Iqbal.7  Among the opinions that did cite the test, the analysis further exam-
ines whether the courts used each of the two prongs to analyze the suffi-
 
1  550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
2  Id. at 563. 
3  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). 
4  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
5  Some scholars and judges believed that Twombly instituted a heightened pleading standard for all 
causes of action.  See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 432 
(2008) (describing Twombly as “decidedly tighten[ing]” the federal pleading standard).  Others confined 
Twombly’s approach to antitrust cases.  See, e.g., Kersenbrock v. Stoneman Cattle Co., No. 07-1044-
MLB, 2007 WL 2219288, at *2 n.2 (D. Kan. July 30, 2007) (“[Twombly] deals only with pleading 
requirements in the highly complex context of an antitrust conspiracy case.  It does not announce a 
general retreat from the notice pleading requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a).”); Lewis v. Marriot Int’l, Inc., 
527 F. Supp. 2d 422, 424 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (noting that the applicability of Twombly to non-Sherman 
Act cases is “unknown”).  A third group of scholars and judges argued that despite its explicit “retiring” 
of the “no set of facts” standard, Twombly would have little practical effect on the outcomes of motions 
to dismiss.  See, e.g., EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(describing Twombly as imposing two “easy-to-clear hurdles” that plaintiffs must surmount); Robert G. 
Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 889 (2009) 
(“Understood relative to a baseline, Twombly’s plausibility standard should have only a minor impact on 
notice pleading as a practical matter.”).  For a more detailed discussion of the confusion surrounding the 
Twombly decision, see infra Part I.C. 
6  129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
7  See infra Part IV.A. 
105:401  (2011) Iqbal as Judicial Rorschach Test 
 403 
ciency of the complaint.8  Finally, the analysis identifies two potential defi-
nitions of plausibility that could be derived from the Iqbal opinion and 
tracks which of these definitions is actually used in the opinions of lower 
courts.9  By using these measures, this Note seeks to determine whether the 
lower courts have articulated a consistent pleading standard in the wake of 
Iqbal. 
In light of the confusion created by Twombly, empirical work provides 
valuable insight for litigants and scholars into how the Iqbal decision is ac-
tually affecting pleading practice.  Indeed, three valuable, though prelimi-
nary, findings emerge from the sample of cases studied here.  First, the 
majority of courts have not even cited the two-pronged Iqbal test, let alone 
applied it.  Second, even those courts that have cited the test often did not 
apply the first prong, which requires the separation of “conclusions of law” 
from “factual allegations.”  Finally, the majority of courts across almost 
every circuit have adopted a “common sense” approach to evaluating plau-
sibility, rather than relying on a “checklist approach,”10 which involves 
matching the factual allegations in the complaint with each element of the 
legal claim. 
The study reveals that Iqbal had served as a judicial Rorschach test11 
for lower courts, with each individual judge using the Court’s dicta to craft 
the pleading standard that the judge feels to be most appropriate.  Judges 
who value judicial efficiency and judges who are sympathetic to defen-
dants’ concerns about costly discovery have used the rigorous combination 
of the two-pronged test and the checklist approach to plausibility to dismiss 
claims they feel are frivolous.  On the other hand, judges sympathetic to the 
idea that, in close cases, courts should err in favor of providing plaintiffs 
with their day in court have employed a more lenient standard by ignoring 
the two-pronged test and defining plausibility as the application of “judicial 
experience and common sense”12 to the facts presented in the complaint.  
Either of these approaches represents a reasonable interpretation of Iqbal, 
but they can yield dramatically different results for litigants.  The results of 
this Note’s analysis suggest that the Court’s effort to clarify federal plead-
ing standards has failed, and that the Twombly and Iqbal opinions have ac-
 
8  See infra Part IV.B. 
9  See infra Part IV.C. 
10  See infra Part II.C (defining the “checklist approach” and the “common sense gloss”). 
11  The Rorschach test, also known as the “inkblot test,” is a psychological test in which subjects’ 
perceptions of ambiguously shaped inkblots are used to examine the subjects’ personality characteristics 
and emotional functioning.  For an overview of the test, see ROBERT M. ALLEN, STUDENT’S ROR-
SCHACH MANUAL 11 (1966); About the Test, INT’L SOC’Y OF THE RORSCHACH & PROJECTIVE 
METHODS, http://www.rorschach.com/pages/rorschach-test/about-the-test.html (last visited Jan. 23, 
2011).  For a discussion of the theoretical foundation of the Rorschach test, see generally ALLEN, supra, 
at 3–8. 
12  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). 
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tually created more inconsistency in the federal pleading standards across 
(and even within) the circuits. 
This Note proceeds in four parts.  Part I describes the evolution of the 
federal pleading standards.  Part II analyzes the Iqbal opinion, identifying 
the two distinct ways in which the Court attempted to clarify Twombly.  
This Part also notes two different interpretations of “plausible” that one 
could potentially synthesize from the sprawling dicta of the opinion.  Part 
III describes the empirical study, and Part IV presents and analyzes the re-
sults. 
I. THE TWOMBLY MESS 
Pleading standards are not merely a procedural hurdle that litigants 
must surmount to proceed to discovery.  On a deeper level, they reflect the 
policy choices underlying our litigation system.  Pleading standards re-
cently shifted in response to concerns about increasing discovery costs and 
crowded federal dockets, resulting in substantial doctrinal confusion among 
lower courts and scholars. 
A. Enactment of the Federal Rules and the Rise of “No Set of Facts” 
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, 
courts and legislators failed to create a pleading standard that struck a stable 
balance between judicial efficiency and adjudicative accuracy.13  During the 
nineteenth century, legislators drafted pleading codes in an attempt to abro-
gate the rigid and esoteric common law pleading rules, which often caused 
potentially meritorious claims to be dismissed due to technical deficien-
cies.14  Code pleading was premised on a single requirement: that plaintiffs 
plead “facts” rather than “legal conclusions.”15  This distinction, however, 
proved extremely difficult to apply in practice because a complaint could 
very rarely present a coherent retelling of the events giving rise to the dis-
pute without using some legal language.16  Courts were thus required to 
draw an arbitrary line along a generality–specificity continuum.17  Although 
 
13  See Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1749, 
1753 (1998) (“[B]ecause pleading practice was littered with arcana, by the early nineteenth century it 
seemed often to produce decisions entirely unrelated to the merits.”). 
14  See Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the Modern World of Civil 
Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly and Iqbal, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
1107, 1111–12 (2010) (explaining common law pleading and describing it as “a confining labyrinth of 
formality”). 
15  Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 862 (2010).   
16  Id. at 863–64; see also Charles E. Clark, The Complaint in Code Pleading, 35 YALE L.J. 259, 
260–68 (1926) (questioning the viability of the distinction between “law” and “fact”). 
17  See Bone, supra note 15, at 864 (arguing that the distinction between legal conclusions and 
factual allegations depends on the degree of factual specificity); see also Walter Wheeler Cook, 
Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 416, 421–22 (1921) (arguing that 
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code pleading was intended “to promote greater clarity and uniformity in 
pleading requirements, prevent unfair surprise to parties, and reduce 
costs,”18 it ultimately failed to render the pleading process more accessible 
to plaintiffs.19  As a result, adjudicatory accuracy was often compromised 
because plaintiffs with meritorious claims were unable to navigate the com-
plex and strictly enforced rules of the pleading process.20 
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure discarded the un-
workable fact–conclusion distinction and implemented a dramatically sim-
plified pleading system.21  Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.”22  Although Rule 12(b)(6) allows the defendant to file a motion to 
dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” the 
plain text of Rule 8 appeared to establish quite a low bar for plaintiffs.  The 
broad and permissive language of the new standard, which would come to 
be called “notice pleading,” revealed an implicit value judgment by the 
drafters of the rules that cases should be decided on the merits after an op-
portunity for discovery and that parties should not be barred from court 
based on the pleadings.23 
Despite its deceptively simple language, Rule 8(a)(2) contained some 
significant ambiguities that required clarification by the courts.  There was 
no precise, objective understanding of what a “short” or “plain” statement 
had to contain, or what a plaintiff had to do to “show[] . . . entitle[ment] to 
relief.”24  The Supreme Court first attempted to articulate a workable plead-
ing standard in Conley v. Gibson, declaring that a complaint should not be 
dismissed at the pleading stage “unless it appears beyond doubt that the 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would enti-
tle him to relief.”25  As commentators subsequently pointed out, the Court 
might not have intended that lower court judges should apply this statement 
literally and thus allow all but the most patently frivolous suits to proceed to 
discovery.26  Rather, the standard was more logically viewed as a codifica-
                                                                                                                           
courts “confuse[] ‘statements of evidence’ with what are really statements of the ‘ultimate facts’ but in 
specific rather than in generic form”). 
18  Schwartz & Appel, supra note 14, at 1114.  
19  See id. at 1116. 
20  See id. (“Thus, on balance, the Field Code left in place a system that still inhibited rather than 
promoted the resolution of claims on the merits.”). 
21  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (“Rule 8 marks a notable and generous 
departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era . . . .”). 
22  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
23  See Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L.J. 177, 181 (1958) (“What 
we require [in Rule 8] is a general statement of the case . . . .  We do not require detail.”).  
24  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
25  355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).   
26  See Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1304 (2010) (quoting 
Twombly’s “retirement” of Conley’s “no set of facts” language to show the Court feared a focused and 
literal reading of it). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 406 
tion of one of the fundamental values of the federal procedural system: po-
tentially valid complaints should not be thrown out because the plaintiffs 
cannot allege all of the relevant facts prior to discovery.27 
In the decades following the Conley decision, lower courts continually 
attempted to impose heightened pleading standards for certain classes of 
cases.28  Judicial concern over the rise in potentially frivolous civil rights 
litigation led courts to require plaintiffs to plead facts, often relating to the 
defendant’s state of mind, without first having the benefit of discovery.29  
The Court rebuffed these attempts, however, emphasizing that the purpose 
of notice pleading was the facilitation of a “proper decision on the merits.”30  
By simplifying the initial stages of the litigation process, the Court ensured 
that plaintiffs would have the opportunity to uncover evidence in support of 
their claims even if those plaintiffs could allege little more than suspicious 
activity prior to discovery.   
B. Twombly and the Plausibility Standard 
After a series of unequivocal affirmations of both Conley and the sys-
temic importance of adjudicating claims on the merits after opportunity for 
discovery,31 the Court appeared to have entrenched a very lenient pleading 
standard.  In 2007, however, the Court expressly “retire[d]” the venerable 
“no set of facts” language from Conley, replacing it with a requirement that 
a complaint be plausible, not merely probable.32  Twombly constituted a 
substantial shift away from protecting plaintiffs’ interests in obtaining ac-
cess to the discovery process and toward protecting defendants from the ex-
penses associated with frivolous litigation. 
 
27  See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 433 (1986) (describing Conley as the Court’s “th[rowing] its weight 
decisively behind the new liberal ethos” underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).  
28  See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 509 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. 
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 165 (1993); see also Christopher M. Fairman, 
The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 988 (2003) (noting the tendency of some lower 
federal courts to “impose non-Rule-based heightened pleading in direct contravention of notice pleading 
doctrine”); Marcus, supra note 27, at 436 (“[F]ederal courts are insisting on detailed factual allegations 
more and more often . . . .”). 
29  Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 552 (2002); see also 
Fairman, supra note 28, at 1011–59 (conducting a “micro-analysis” of pleading practices across 
different areas of substantive law, including antitrust, CERCLA, RICO, negligence, and conspiracy). 
30  Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 
48). 
31  See, e.g., Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 (“The liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is the starting 
point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim.”); 
Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168–69 (noting that under the current “notice pleading system,” federal courts 
can use control of discovery and summary judgment, rather than heightened pleading requirements, to 
weed out nonmeritorious claims). 
32  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 563 (2007).  
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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly was a massive class action lawsuit filed 
on behalf of all subscribers to local telephone and high-speed internet ser-
vices from 1996 to 2007.33  The plaintiffs alleged that four of the nation’s 
largest telecommunications companies (Incumbent Local Exchange Carri-
ers, or ILECs) had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act34 by conspiring to 
restrain trade in two ways, both of which allegedly led to higher fees for lo-
cal telephone and high-speed internet services.35  Aside from a general 
statement made by the Chief Executive Officer of one of the ILECs, the 
plaintiffs could offer no factual allegations showing the existence of such a 
conspiracy.36  Instead, they asked the court to infer that the ILECs had en-
tered into such an agreement based on the absence of any meaningful effort 
by the ILECs to enter each other’s markets and the identical tactics ILECs 
employed to undermine the upstart “Competitive Local Exchange Carriers” 
(CLECs).37 
The district court concluded that allegations of parallel business con-
duct did not adequately state a claim for conspiracy and subsequently dis-
missed the complaint for failure to state a claim.38  The Second Circuit 
reversed.39  Echoing the seminal statement in Conley v. Gibson, the panel 
reasoned that “to rule that allegations of parallel anticompetitive conduct 
fail to support a plausible conspiracy claim, a court would have to conclude 
that there is no set of facts that would permit a plaintiff to demonstrate that 
the particular parallelism asserted was the product of collusion rather than 
coincidence.”40  The Supreme Court “granted certiorari to address the 
 
33  Id. at 550. 
34  15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006). 
35  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550.  First, the plaintiffs alleged that the ILECs had “engaged in parallel 
conduct in their respective service areas to inhibit the growth” of their competitors.  Id. (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  Second, the complaint alleged that the ILECs had also conspired (and ultimately 
pledged) to refrain from competing with each other by deciding not to expand beyond their regional 
bases.  Id. at 551. 
36  The closest the plaintiffs came to evidence of a conspiracy was a statement by Richard Notebaert, 
Chief Executive Officer of one of the ILECs, that encroaching upon the market of another ILEC “might 
be a good way to turn a quick dollar but that doesn’t make it right.”  Id. at 551. 
37  Id.  CLECs were communications companies founded after the 1984 divestiture of AT&T’s local 
telephone services.  Id. at 549.  The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 
(1996), imposed a host of duties on the ILECs, most of which were intended to facilitate the CLECs’ 
entry into the market for local telephone service.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 549. 
38  Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated, 425 F.3d 99 (2d 
Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 544.  The court reasoned that the defendants’ behavior could be fully 
explained by the completely lawful and economically rational impulse to defend their original territories.  
Id.  
39  Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 119 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added), rev’d, 550 U.S. 
544. 
40  Id. at 114 (emphasis added).  The court acknowledged that while the complaint must state facts 
that render a conspiracy plausible, “plus factors” showing more than parallel conduct (which is not 
illegal under the Sherman Act) are not required at the pleading stage.  Id. 
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proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of 
parallel conduct.”41   
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, began the Twombly opinion’s 
analysis by reiterating one of the fundamental tenets of federal pleading 
practice: the longstanding Conley principle that a complaint need only pro-
vide “fair notice” to the defendant.42  Despite this initial nod to the govern-
ing precedent, however, the Court proceeded to alter its interpretation of 
Rule 8(a)(2) dramatically.  In Conley and its progeny, the Court based its 
analysis of the factual sufficiency of the complaint on Rule 8(a)(2)’s re-
quirement of a “short and plain” statement,43 which implies that a plaintiff 
need not supply much factual detail to survive a motion to dismiss. 
By contrast, the Twombly majority focused on the Rule’s requirement 
that claimants “show” and state the grounds for their entitlement to relief.44  
Adequately doing so, the Court reasoned, requires the complaint to provide 
some degree of factual detail beyond mere “labels and conclusions”; a 
“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”45  
The Court emphasized the need to provide sufficient factual allegations to 
“raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”46  The Court’s new in-
terpretation stood in stark contrast to the earlier “no set of facts” standard, 
under which a complaint should have been deemed sufficient if there was  
any possibility that the allegations were true. 
Recognizing the irreconcilable conflict between the “no set of facts” 
language and its more stringent analysis of the Twombly complaint, the 
Court dropped a bombshell.  Justice Souter declared that, after nearly fifty 
years of extensive use,47 the “no set of facts” phrase had “earned its retire-
ment” and was “best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an ac-
cepted pleading standard: once a claim has been stated adequately, it may 
be supported by any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the com-
plaint.”48  By doing so, the Court discarded the only language in the Conley 
opinion that offered a serviceably specific standard by which lower courts 
could assess the sufficiency of complaints. 
 
41  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553.  The narrow framing of the question presented might have been one of 
the sources of judicial and scholarly confusion regarding the applicability of the plausibility standard to 
all civil actions.  See infra Part I.C. 
42  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
43  See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S 41, 47 (1957) (“[A]ll the Rules require is ‘a short and plain 
statement of the claim’ . . . .” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2))); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 
534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 
44  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
45  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
46  Id.  
47  According to Westlaw’s KeyCite service, as of October 31, 2010, federal courts had cited Conley 
v. Gibson 49,988 times.   
48  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 (emphasis added). 
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The Court, however, did provide a replacement standard: to survive a 
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim 
to relief that is plausible on its face.”49  Although Twombly concluded by re-
assuring lower courts (and litigants) that the new pleading standard did not 
require “heightened fact pleading of specifics,”50 the opinion did not purport 
to establish any concrete definition of “plausibility.”  Rather, it provided 
lower courts with only a few abstract statements describing what type of 
complaint would not pass muster under the new standard.  For example, a 
plausible claim, as noted above, cannot be “speculative,”51 and a plaintiff 
must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation 
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”52  Lower courts, however, 
should not mistake plausibility for a probability requirement involving an 
assessment of the likelihood that the suit would survive summary judgment 
or succeed at trial.53  A valid complaint must simply provide enough facts to 
“raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal 
[conduct].”54   
Applying the new plausibility test, the Court reversed the Second Cir-
cuit,55 holding that facts alleging conscious parallel conduct without any 
showing of agreement or conspiracy did not state a plausible claim for relief 
under the Sherman Act.56  The Court did not, however, rest its decision en-
tirely on the sufficiency of the facts contained in the complaint.  Justice 
Souter also noted the massive expenditure of time and money involved in 
antitrust discovery.57  Requiring plaintiffs to provide facts plausibly suggest-
ing conspiracy at the pleading stage would avoid inflicting on defendants 
“the potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with no reasonably 
 
49  Id. at 570. 
50  Id; see also id. at 555 (“[A] complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not 
need detailed factual allegations . . . .”). 
51  Id. at 555. 
52  Id. 
53  Id. at 556. 
54  Id. 
55  Id. at 553. 
56  See id. at 548–49, 556. 
57  See id. at 558.  Any court that strictly construed the “no set of facts” language in Conley would 
essentially be mandated to allow such a case to proceed to discovery, even if the allegations contained 
therein were facially implausible.  The Twombly Court feared that the lenient Conley standard, combined 
with the threat of expensive discovery, would encourage defendants to settle “even anemic cases” early 
in the litigation process.  Id. at 559.  The Court noted that the threat was obvious in the instant case, as 
the plaintiffs represented a class consisting “of at least 90 percent of all subscribers to local telephone or 
high-speed Internet services” in the United States, the defendants were the country’s largest 
telecommunications firms, and the antitrust violations allegedly occurred over the course of seven years.  
Id. 
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founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence to 
support a § 1 claim.”58   
Twombly did much more than change the standard for evaluating the 
sufficiency of pleadings.  On a broader scale, Twombly reflected a policy 
judgment as to the appropriate ordering of the core values underlying the 
pleading system.59  According to Conley and its progeny, the purpose of the 
notice pleading standard, and the procedural system in general, was to fa-
cilitate judgments on the merits after all parties had the opportunity to un-
cover the full scope of the facts relevant to their cases.60  Twombly implied 
that such an ideal is outdated under the modern realities of our legal system.  
With the advent of enormous class action suits and the expansion of discov-
ery costs, courts can no longer realistically hope to manage every case filed 
in federal court.61  As a result, the Court implicitly elevated the goal of judi-
cial efficiency and docket reduction over the goal of accurate adjudication 
on the merits.  By explicitly imposing a threshold screening requirement, 
the Court now seemed willing to sacrifice a few potentially meritorious 
claims to save defendants the cost of litigating the (presumably many) 
frivolous ones.  This policy choice reflected the heart of the historical de-
bate surrounding pleading doctrine and enhanced its contemporary salience. 
 
58  Id. at 559 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Dura Pharm., Inc. v. 
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).  The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the district courts 
could effectively regulate the discovery process, and it instead mandated that a safeguard be 
incorporated into the federal pleading standard.  Id. at 559 (“It is no answer to say that a claim just shy 
of a plausible entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process 
through ‘careful case management,’ given the common lament that the success of judicial supervision in 
checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side.” (citation omitted)). 
59  For discussions of the policy implications of the Twombly decision, see generally Bone, supra 
note 5, which argues that a pleading requirement along the lines of Twombly’s plausibility standard 
might be justified by a process-based theory of fairness; Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, 
Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821 (2010), which argues that the Court 
destabilized the entire civil litigation system without adequate warning or thought; Lonny S. Hoffman, 
Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About 
Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217 (2008), which argues that awareness of the 
linkages between pleading, summary judgment, and removal law will lead to the establishment of 
meaningful constraints on the exercise of judicial power in the pleading stage; Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic 
and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a 
Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604 (2006), which suggests a pleading 
template that differentiates between three related but distinct pleading principles and defending Twombly 
in terms of the proposed pleading template; Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed 
Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, which argues that 
courts should be more cautious when using the plausibility standard to dismiss employment 
discrimination claims early in the proceedings; and Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 
61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90 (2009), which argues that bifurcating pleading standards along cost-disparity 
lines will curtail economic gamesmanship in civil litigation.   
60  See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). 
61  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559. 
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C. Confusion in the Wake of Twombly 
The Twombly opinion clearly abrogated the “no set of facts” standard 
and replaced it with the requirement that a complaint state a claim for relief 
that is “plausible on its face.”62  Courts and scholars were confused, how-
ever, regarding when and how the Twombly standard should be applied.  
Some judges and scholars argued that the radical change in pleading stan-
dards applied only to the substantive area of antitrust law, or at most to dis-
covery-intensive cases in general.63  These commentators pointed to the 
narrow question presented in Twombly,64 the continued validity of the con-
clusory form complaints in the appendix of the Federal Rules,65 and the 
Court’s short, per curiam opinion in Erickson v. Pardus,66 which was issued 
two weeks after the Court decided Twombly.  In Erickson, the Court re-
versed the Tenth Circuit’s determination that the claim of a federal prisoner 
was “too conclusory” to survive a motion to dismiss without mentioning the 
plausibility standard established by Twombly.67  In fact, Erickson cited 
Twombly to affirm the central tenet of notice pleading established by 
Conley: the “short and plain statement” required by Rule 8(a)(2) “need only 
‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds 
 
62  Id. at 570.   
63  See, e.g., Morgan v. Hanna Holdings, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 2d 404, 407 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (noting that 
Twombly “required a heightened degree of fact pleading in an anti-trust case”).  But see Kasten v. Ford 
Motor Co., No. 09-11754, 2009 WL 3628012, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 2009) (referring to Twombly as 
an “antitrust case” but explaining that Iqbal declared that the Twombly standard would “henceforth 
apply to ‘all civil actions’”); Spencer, supra note 5, at 431 (declaring that “[n]otice pleading is dead” 
after Twombly). 
64  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548–49 (“The question in this putative class action is whether a § 1 
complaint can survive a motion to dismiss when it alleges that major telecommunications providers 
engaged in certain parallel conduct unfavorable to competition, absent some factual context suggesting 
agreement, as distinct from identical, independent action.”). 
65  For example, Form 11 allows the plaintiff to allege, in relevant part, that “On <Date>, at <Place>, 
the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff.”  FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11.  The 
plaintiff may alter the “drove a motor vehicle” element as well as the date and place.  Forms 12 through 
21 provide similarly sparse form complaints for various causes of action, including conversion of 
property and patent infringement.  These forms are rendered automatically valid by Federal Rule 84.  As 
the Twombly dissenters and subsequent scholars have pointed out, however, the crux of this complaint—
that the defendant drove “negligently”—is indisputably a legal conclusion.  See Twombly, 554 U.S. at 
576 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the bare allegation of “negligence” in the form complaint 
suffices under the notice pleading standard, even though it would have been called a “conclusion of law” 
under code pleading).  See Ides, supra note 59, at 633 (“[I]t is difficult if not impossible to distinguish 
between the supposedly sufficient ‘negligently drove’ allegation in [former] Form 9 [now Form 11], 
where no specific facts of negligence are alleged, and the supposedly inadequate, ‘fact-deficient’ 
allegation of an antitrust conspiracy (or any other type of conspiracy) . . . .”). 
66  551 U.S. 89 (2007).  In Erickson, a federal prisoner filed a § 1983 claim alleging that prison 
officials had acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs.  Id. at 90. 
67  Id. at 94 (“The case cannot, however, be dismissed on the ground that petitioner’s allegations of 
harm were too conclusory to put these matters in issue.”). 
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upon which it rests.’”68  Some lower courts, unsure whether the Court in-
tended Erickson to supersede or restrict the applicability of Twombly, rea-
soned that the preliminary requirement of plausibility should only be 
imposed in certain cases, particularly those involving potentially costly or 
time-consuming discovery.69 
Not only were courts confused as to when Twombly should apply, but 
they also struggled with the application of the standard itself.70  If a court 
decided that Twombly provides the governing standard, how would it begin 
to apply a test for plausibility?  At most, Justice Souter’s opinion provided 
guideposts by which the courts could determine what plausibility is not—it 
is not a “probability requirement,” nor is it a requirement that a plaintiff 
provide “detailed factual allegations.”71  But there is significant gray area 
between a literal reading of the “no set of facts” standard and an outright 
imposition of fact pleading.  Some courts interpreted plausibility as impos-
ing a heightened pleading standard,72 while others, relying on the Court’s 
assurance that Rule 8 does not require a plaintiff to plead “in detail,”73 rea-
soned that the Court had not appreciably changed the pleading standard.74   
 
68  Id. at 93–94 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56).  Because the plaintiff in Erickson proceeded 
pro se, however, it remained unclear how much impact the Court intended this opinion to have on 
general pleading doctrine.  See id. at 94 (“The Court of Appeals’ departure from the liberal pleading 
standards set forth by Rule 8(a)(2) is even more pronounced in this particular case because petitioner has 
been proceeding, from the litigation’s outset, without counsel.  A document filed pro se is ‘to be 
liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent 
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” (citation omitted)).   
69  See, e.g., Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e believe the Court is not 
requiring a universal standard of heightened fact pleading, but is instead requiring a flexible ‘plausibility 
standard,’ which obliges a pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts 
where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.”), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Ides, supra note 59, at 638–39 (arguing that the “rapidly prepared and issued 
Erickson opinion” was issued as a “reassurance that the Bell Atlantic decision had not altered Rule 
8(a)(2) pleading principles”). 
70  See Jason Bartlett, Comment, Into the Wild: The Uneven and Self-defeating Effects of Bell 
Atlantic v. Twombly, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 73, 89 (2009) (arguing that the plausibility 
standard  promotes disparate and inconsistent results).  
71  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
72  See, e.g., Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 286–87 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (requiring that a 
plaintiff essentially plead a prima facie case in order to avoid a motion to dismiss since the judge found 
it was unlikely that, based on the complaint, the plaintiffs would ever be able to show no public benefit 
from the defendants’ actions).  See generally Bartlett, supra note 70, at 85–106 (describing the varying 
interpretations of Twombly across courts). 
73  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (“[W]e do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only 
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”). 
74  See, e.g., Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court 
never said that it intended a drastic change in the law, and indeed strove to convey the opposite 
impression; even in rejecting Conley’s ‘no set of facts’ language, the Court does not appear to have 
believed that it was really changing the Rule 8 or Rule 12(b)(6) framework.”); EEOC v. Concentra 
Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 780 (7th Cir. 2007) (interpreting plausibility as the reaffirmation of 
the principle that plaintiffs may not disguise the nature of their claims). 
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Empirical studies tracking the percentages of claims dismissed under 
Conley and Twombly showed a slight but statistically significant increase in 
the percentage of 12(b)(6) motions granted.75  Recently, Professor Patricia 
Hatamyar conducted an empirical study that analyzed and compared dis-
missal rates under the Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal pleading standards.76  
Her sample included 1039 cases, including approximately 440 from the 
two-year period preceding Twombly, 422 from the two-year period after 
Twombly, and 173 from the three-month period following the Iqbal deci-
sion.77  In coding the cases, she tracked the courts’ rulings and categorized 
the cases based on the underlying area of substantive law.78  Her analysis 
revealed a statistically significant increase in overall dismissal rates under 
the Twombly and Iqbal standards,79 although motions that were granted with 
leave to amend accounted for much of the increase.80   
II.  IQBAL AS JANITOR: CLEANING UP THE TWOMBLY MESS 
The Supreme Court moved quickly to corral the confusion that arose 
among the lower courts in the wake of Twombly.  Less than two years after 
it introduced the plausibility standard in Twombly, the Court clarified its in-
terpretation of Rule 8(a) in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.81  The case resolved some of 
most glaring ambiguities of the Twombly decision by establishing that the 
plausibility standard applies to all civil cases82 and by precluding courts 
from lowering the Rule 8(a) standard in favor of allowing limited discovery 
on certain factual issues.83  More importantly, it offered two levels of guid-
ance—“analytical” and “substantive”—to aid lower courts in determining 
whether a complaint contains sufficient factual detail to survive a motion to 
dismiss.   
This Part analyzes the Iqbal decision.  It begins with a brief description 
of the facts and basic reasoning of the case.  Second, it argues that Iqbal 
makes two distinct contributions to pleading doctrine by providing both an 
analytical and a substantive clarification of the plausibility standard.  This 
analysis forms the basis of the empirical questions analyzed in Parts III and 
IV. 
 
75  See, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter 
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2010). 
76  Id.  
77  Id. at 601. 
78  Id. at 590–93 (describing how Hatamyar categorized the cases in her sample). 
79  Id. at 599. 
80  Id.  
81  129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
82  Id. at 1953. 
83  Id.  In Twombly, the respondents proposed a plan of “phased discovery” limited to the issues of 
alleged conspiracy and class certification.  Justice Stevens cited this plan approvingly in dissent.  See 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 593–94 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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A. Background 
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, a Pakistani Muslim brought a Bivens action84 
against various federal officials—including then-Attorney General John 
Ashcroft and Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Robert 
Mueller—related to his detention by the FBI during a post-9/11 investiga-
tion.85  The complaint alleged that Ashcroft and Mueller violated Iqbal’s 
First and Fifth Amendment rights by designating him a “person of high in-
terest” based on his race, religion, or national origin.86  The relevant part al-
leged the following: 
[T]he Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . , under the direction of Defendant 
MUELLER, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men . . . as part 
of its investigation of the events of September 11. . . .  The policy of holding 
post-September-11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement 
until they were cleared by the FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT 
and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001.87 
The pleading described Ashcroft as the “principal architect” of the policy 
and alleged that Mueller was “instrumental in [its] adoption, promulgation, 
and implementation.”88   
Ashcroft and Mueller filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the claim 
for failure to state sufficient facts to show their involvement in unconstitu-
tional conduct.89  The district court, ruling on the motion before the Su-
preme Court decided Twombly, denied the motion under Conley’s lenient 
“no set of facts” standard.90  The defendants filed an interlocutory appeal 
with the Second Circuit, and Twombly was decided during the pendency of 
that appeal.91  The Second Circuit affirmed in part the ruling of the district 
court, reasoning that Twombly established a “flexible plausibility standard” 
under which certain types of lawsuits (such as antitrust) require “amplifica-
tion” of the factual allegations to render the claim “plausible.”92  Discrimi-
nation claims, it found, were not one of “those contexts” in which the law 
 
84  See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 
(1971) (holding that the violation of constitutional rights by a federal agent acting under color of his 
authority gives rise to an action for damages). 
85  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943–44. 
86  Id. at 1944. 
87  First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at ¶¶ 47, 69, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-
1809 (JG)(JA) (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004), 2004 WL 3756442. 
88  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944. 
89  Id.  In their response, the defendants pleaded the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.  Id. at 
1942.   
90  See id. at 1944. 
91  Id. 
92  Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 
1937 (2009). 
105:401  (2011) Iqbal as Judicial Rorschach Test 
 415 
required additional factual specificity.93  In his concurring opinion, Judge 
Cabranes requested that the Supreme Court address the issue of the appro-
priate standard in cases involving a defense of qualified immunity.94   
Rather than confining its analysis to the narrower qualified immunity 
issue, however, the Supreme Court used Ashcroft v. Iqbal as an opportunity 
to clarify the general pleading standard on two distinct levels.  On an ana-
lytical level, Iqbal established a two-pronged test for the application of the 
plausibility standard.  Meanwhile, it also provided a substantive clarifica-
tion that sought to provide a positive explanation of what degree of factual 
detail is necessary to render a claim “plausible on its face.”95 
B. Analytical Clarification: Establishing a Two-Pronged Test for 
Determining the Adequacy of a Complaint 
This section describes Iqbal’s analytical clarification of the pleading 
standard and presents the empirical questions used in Parts III and IV to 
evaluate the success of the Court’s clarification.  Iqbal’s first major doc-
trinal contribution consists of a two-pronged test designed to provide a con-
crete, accessible method by which lower courts could apply the rather 
arcane plausibility requirement.  At the outset of Iqbal’s sufficiency analy-
sis, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, identified two “working prin-
ciples” underlying the Court’s decision in Twombly.96  First, although a 
court must accept all factual allegations as true for the purpose of a motion 
to dismiss, it should not extend that tenet to legal conclusions.97  Second, a 
complaint must state a “plausible” claim for relief to survive a motion to 
dismiss.98  In articulating these principles, the Court noted that while Rule 8 
certainly marks a “notable and generous” departure from the “hyper-
technical” requirements of the prior code pleading regime, it “does not 
unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than 
conclusions.”99  
Iqbal derived a two-pronged test from Twombly’s working principles 
and suggested, rather than mandated, its application by lower courts.  The 
first prong says that “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to 
begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclu-
sions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”100  The second prong says 
that once the court jettisons these legal conclusions, it must assume the ve-
racity of the remaining well-pleaded factual allegations and “determine 
 
93  Id. at 174. 
94  Id. at 178 (Cabranes, J., concurring). 
95  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
96  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 
97  Id. at 1949–50. 
98  Id. at 1950.  
99  Id.  
100  Id. (emphasis added). 
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whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”101  This test 
represents Iqbal’s unique, positive contribution to pleading doctrine, as 
Twombly did not endeavor to establish any rigid analytical framework 
through which courts could assess the factual sufficiency of complaints.102   
The test represented a major doctrinal shift because it transformed the 
plausibility inquiry from a nebulous interpretive standard into a mechanistic 
two-part inquiry that should theoretically lead to a more uniform applica-
tion of the federal pleading standard.  It instructed the lower courts as to 
which type of legal allegations to disregard (“[t]hreadbare recitals of the 
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements”103) 
and which type of facts to evaluate under the plausibility standard.104   
But in the immediate aftermath of the Iqbal decision, have the lower 
courts actually applied the new test?  The permissive language of the opin-
ion, specifically the recommendation that a court “can choose” to begin its 
analysis of a pleading with the first prong of the test, means that the uni-
form usage of Iqbal’s analytical clarification is far from a foregone conclu-
sion.   
The first two questions posed in this Note’s empirical study related to 
the application of the two-pronged test.  How often do lower courts cite the 
test in their summations of relevant pleading doctrine?105  And more impor-
tantly, if they do cite it, do they explicitly apply it in their opinions?106  
These preliminary inquiries will give litigants and scholars some idea of 
whether or not the lower courts find this analytical clarification of the plau-
sibility standard to be a useful doctrinal contribution.  Also, these empirical 
 
101  Id. 
102  Other scholars agree that the distinction between facts and conclusions departs sharply from the 
Court’s reasoning in Twombly.  See Bone, supra note 15, at 869. To be sure, the Court attempted to 
couch the two-pronged test as virtually indistinguishable from the reasoning of Twombly, asserting that 
in Twombly, the Court implicitly determined that the plaintiffs’ assertion of an unlawful agreement was a 
“legal conclusion” and thus not entitled to an assumption of truth.  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.  Absent that 
allegation, the complaint failed to pass the plausibility threshold because the telecommunications 
companies’ actions were more likely explained by lawful, free-market explanations.  Id.  It is important 
to note, however, that the Twombly court never differentiated between legal conclusions and well-
pleaded facts.  Rather, it analyzed the complaint holistically en route to a determination that the 
defendants’ parallel conduct, assessed under the totality of the circumstances, did not seem suspicious.  
The two-pronged test represented the majority’s interpretation of the reasoning behind Twombly, not a 
reshaping or clarification of the expressed reasoning used to reach that holding. 
103  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 
104  The test itself does not clarify the “plausibility standard” but rather provides a framework 
through which courts can apply the standard to the appropriate type of allegations.  I argue that Iqbal 
presents a further substantive clarification of plausibility by describing it in terms more accessible to 
courts.  See infra Part II.C. 
105  See infra Part IV.A and Figure 1. 
106  The “explicit application” question of this empirical study tracked whether courts designate 
particular parts of the complaint as “legal conclusions not entitled to the assumption of truth,” as 
suggested by the first prong of the test, before they evaluate the plausibility of the claim.  See infra Part 
IV.B and Table 1. 
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measures will indicate whether the Iqbal decision has indeed helped the 
lower courts move toward the uniform application of a pleading standard. 
C. Substantive Clarification of Plausibility: The Checklist Approach 
Versus the Common Sense Gloss 
While Iqbal’s analytical clarification attempted to establish a uniform 
method of application across the circuits, its “substantive clarification” of 
the plausibility requirement sought to establish a more concrete standard 
regarding how much detail a complaint must contain to “nudge[] [it] across 
the line from conceivable to plausible.”107  The language of the opinion, 
however, has given rise to at least two distinct but equally viable interpreta-
tions of the contours of plausibility.  The first interpretation, which I refer to 
as the “checklist approach,” suggests that each element of the legal claim 
must be supported by factual allegations.  The second, by contrast, suggests 
that a complaint need only provide sufficient factual detail to trigger a 
judge’s common sense determination that the defendant likely behaved 
wrongfully.  I call this interpretation the “common sense gloss.”  This sec-
tion discusses each of these interpretations in turn and explains how the 
empirical portion of this Note evaluates which of these potential substantive 
clarifications have been used by lower courts. 
Iqbal strongly suggested that the level of plausibility of the complaint 
is directly correlated with the level of factual detail provided by the plain-
tiff.  The checklist approach to plausibility demands “more than an un-
adorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”108  Moreover, 
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 
conclusory statements, do not suffice.”109  While legal conclusions may pro-
vide the “framework” for the complaint, each of them “must be supported 
by factual allegations.”110  The empirical portion of this Note tracks lower 
courts’ citations of statements that are emblematic of the checklist approach 
to determine whether courts are indeed assessing the plausibility of com-
plaints by matching particular factual details to each element of the legal 
claim. 
On the other hand, the Court also seemed to endorse a “common 
sense” gloss on plausibility.  Certain statements in the Iqbal opinion urged 
judges not to focus on the number of facts required but rather to use their 
“judicial experience and common sense”111 to draw “reasonable infer-
ence[s]” regarding whether there was unlawful conduct afoot.112  In its ini-
tial description of the plausibility principle underlying Twombly, the Court 
 
107  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
108  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 
109  Id. 
110  Id. at 1950. 
111  Id. 
112  Id. at 1949. 
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acknowledged that determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim 
is necessarily “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to 
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”113  A plausible claim 
will contain facts that allow the court “to draw the reasonable inference that 
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”114  This Note’s empirical 
study also tracked judges’ citations of two representative descriptions of the 
“common sense gloss” to determine the level of traction that this interpreta-
tion has gained among the district courts and to compare its use to that of 
the checklist approach. 
In most cases, application of the checklist approach and the common 
sense gloss should lead to the same result, as a complaint generally must 
contain more than conclusory allegations to trigger the judge’s common 
sense determination that the defendant might indeed be liable for the al-
leged illegal behavior.  At the margins, however, the two standards could 
lead to different results.  As other scholars have noted, the checklist ap-
proach might render certain types of claims, such as antitrust or employ-
ment discrimination, particularly susceptible to dismissal at the pleading 
stage because, without discovery, plaintiffs would not be able to provide 
sufficient factual support for all elements of their claims.115  If a judge uses 
the common sense gloss, however, his visceral instinct that the conduct 
reeks of wrongdoing would necessitate the denial of a motion to dismiss 
even if the complaint did not provide facts supporting each element of the 
claim.  The potential divergence is particularly problematic in two types of 
cases: (1) enormous class actions and other cases with high discovery costs, 
like Twombly, in which courts might be motivated to impose a higher plead-
ing standard to avoid burdensome discovery;116 and (2) civil rights cases, 
which make up a disproportionately large percentage of the federal docket117 
and which are sometimes already subject to threshold screening require-
ments.118 
Thus, although Iqbal purported to offer substantive clarification of the 
definition of “plausibility,” it instead created a type of judicial Rorschach 
test.  Courts can seize on one of two different definitions of the term, which 
 
113  Id. at 1950 (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
114  Id. at 1949. 
115  See Bone, supra note 15, at 878–79 (noting that civil rights claims and other cases involving 
state-of-mind elements face disproportionately adverse effects under Iqbal); Seiner, supra note 59, at 
1015 (arguing that courts should be more cautious in applying the two-pronged Iqbal test to employment 
discrimination cases because the test often poses an insurmountable barrier for even meritorious suits). 
116  See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). 
117  See Hatamyar, supra note 75, at 604 (finding that civil rights cases overall comprise 44% of her 
representative database of federal cases). 
118  For example, plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis must survive a sua sponte motion to 
dismiss.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006) (establishing that in proceedings filed by plaintiffs 
proceeding in forma pauperis, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines 
that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted”). 
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could result in markedly different results for certain types of claims.  The 
third empirical question addressed by this Note seeks to determine which of 
the two interpretations of plausibility have gained the most traction among 
the lower courts and whether there is any identifiable variability among the 
circuits.  Answering this question will help litigants draft claims that are 
more likely to survive motions to dismiss (or to identify claims susceptible 
to challenge at this stage).  It will also help to direct scholarly attention to 
the actual changes that Iqbal has wrought on our system so that further 
study can spell out the implications of the Twombly–Iqbal standard. 
III. HOW DISTRICT COURTS INTERPRET IQBAL 
The empirical questions presented in this Note analyze which portions 
of Iqbal judges choose to cite in their opinions.  As my discussions of the 
analytical and substantive clarifications make clear, Iqbal is, in some sense, 
a judicial Rorschach test.  In crafting their statements of the governing 
pleading doctrine, judges pick and choose which statements to use (and 
which statements to ignore) to define the relevant standard.   
The empirical portion of this Note tackles three distinct questions.  
First, this study measured whether federal district courts have cited the two-
pronged Iqbal test when they analyzed the factual sufficiency of com-
plaints.  Put another way, were they actually using the analytical clarifica-
tion offered by the Court?  Second, building on the first question, this study 
measured whether the courts that did cite the two-pronged test explicitly 
applied both elements of that test in their analysis of the complaint.  In an-
swering this question, the study asks whether the opinion articulated which 
elements of the complaint were “legal conclusions” (and thus not entitled to 
an assumption of truth) and which elements were “facts” subject to the 
plausibility analysis of the second prong.  If these courts were applying this 
two-part analytical framework, then perhaps the Court’s attempt to clarify 
its opinion in Twombly has indeed resulted in the application of a uniform 
standard across all of the circuits.   
While the first two questions pertain to the analytical clarification of-
fered by the two-pronged test, the third question evaluates the substantive 
clarification of the meaning of “plausibility.”  Far from creating one readily 
identifiable definition of plausibility, Iqbal offered multiple potential “clari-
fications” of the doctrine, ranging from a checklist approach resembling 
fact pleading to a potentially more lenient common sense approach that 
would enable suspicious but factually deficient allegations to proceed to 
discovery.  Because it is important for litigants to know the standard by 
which courts will measure their complaints for plausibility, this study 
tracked courts’ citations of four statements from the Iqbal opinion, two of 
which encapsulate the checklist approach and two of which are emblematic 
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of the common sense gloss.119  The goal of the third question, then, is to de-
termine whether the substantive contours of plausibility, i.e., what a com-
plaint must contain to survive a motion to dismiss, have remained constant 
across district courts within the various circuits. 
A. Contents of Sample 
The study analyzed 10% of the federal district court cases that cited 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal and were decided in the first six months following the es-
tablishment of the new test.120  The 10% sample size was large enough to 
result in generalizable findings but still small enough to allow the level of 
in-depth analysis of the decisions necessary to determine whether or not a 
court “applied” the Iqbal test.  A search on the commercial legal database 
Westlaw indicated that Iqbal was cited 1592 times between May 18, 2009, 
and November 18, 2009.121  Each circuit had equal proportional representa-
tion within the 196-case sample, which allowed me to assess whether the 
application of the analytical and substantive clarifications varied by cir-
cuit.122   
 
119  The two statements representing the checklist approach are (1) “While legal conclusions can 
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations,” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 
at 1950, and (2) Rule 8 demands “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 
accusation,” id. at 1949.  The two statements representing the common sense gloss are (1) “A claim has 
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” id., and (2) “Determining whether a 
complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing 
court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense,” id. at 1950. 
120  Iqbal was decided on May 18, 2009, so I limited the search for district court cases to those 
decided on or before November 18, 2009. 
121  To arrive at this figure, I first searched for federal cases citing “Ashcroft v. Iqbal” and 
“12(b)(6),” which yielded approximately 4100 cases.  I then searched for cases citing “Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal,” “12(b)(6),” and “pro se,” and subtracted those cases from the total.  I did not include pro se 
litigants in the empirical study because pro se complaints are assessed under a more lenient standard 
than are complaints written by attorneys.  See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).  Other 
empirical studies tracking dismissal rates under the Twombly, Conley, and Iqbal standards also excluded 
pro se plaintiffs from their data.  See, e.g., Hatamyar, supra note 75, at 585 (excluding reviews of 
complaints submitted with an application to proceed in forma pauperis), Kendall W. Hannon, Note, 
Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) 
Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1832–33 (2008). 
122  In this case, sampling by circuit is preferable to a completely random sample because the 
number of cases citing Iqbal varies dramatically by circuit.  For example, the Ninth Circuit cited Iqbal 
401 times as of October 5, 2009, while the Tenth Circuit cited it only 80 times during the same period.  
A 10% random sample of the entire body of cases citing Iqbal might have led to underrepresentation of 
the smaller circuits.  On the other hand, the “random” element might have caused the sample to swing 
the other way and proportionally overrepresent them.  Sampling by circuit prevented such skewing of 
the data and allows for identification of trends within the different circuits. 
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The study focused on district court cases123 and excluded circuit court 
opinions because district court judges are “on the front line” of applying the 
relevant standards.124  Their day-to-day applications of the test and its ac-
companying standards will determine the ultimate effectiveness of the Su-
preme Court’s attempt to clean up the Twombly mess.  Put bluntly, the 
district courts can render the Supreme Court’s efforts meaningless by sim-
ply declining to apply either, or both, of Iqbal’s purported clarifications of 
the pleading standard.  Moreover, while district courts are technically 
bound by the opinions of their circuit courts, they are not directly super-
vised.125  Although a small percentage of cases might come before the cir-
cuit court and might be subject to reversal for their failures to undertake the 
correct analysis,126 the vast majority of district court rulings represent the fi-
nal say on a motion to dismiss.127 
B. Method of Selection 
I retrieved cases from Westlaw by conducting a “Citing References” 
search, which returns all decisions citing a particular legal conclusion.  
From there, I limited the results to federal district court cases and further 
limited the cases by circuit.  Within each circuit, I used a random number 
 
123  This study used both reported and unreported opinions.  Although the latter are not published, 
their reasoning still provides guidance to the individual litigants as to the level of factual sufficiency 
required to survive a motion to dismiss.  As such, their reasoning is still valuable for purposes of 
evaluating how the lower courts have interpreted Iqbal.   
124  Hatamyar, supra note 75, at 584. 
125  For example, the Third Circuit mandated the use of the two-pronged test in Fowler v. UPMC 
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009).  The data in this study show, however, that lower 
courts have been inconsistent in even citing the test, let alone rigorously applying it.  See infra Part IV.  
126  For example, according to a Westlaw “Citing References” search conducted on October 24, 
2010, the Second Circuit had cited Ashcroft v. Iqbal 128 times.  During the same time period, the district 
courts within that circuit had cited Ashcroft v. Iqbal 1611 times.  According to these figures, the Second 
Circuit reviewed only 7.9% of the decisions citing Iqbal.  Admittedly, this figure is a rather rough esti-
mate of the number of decisions that receive appellate review at the pleading stage.  The actual 
percentage could be much smaller because most district court orders are never published.  See 
Hatamyar, supra note 75, at 584 n.198 (noting that, according to one estimate, only 3% of all district 
court orders are available on Westlaw and Lexis).  On the other hand, the actual figure could be larger 
because the “Citing References” search did not account for the (potentially large) number of cases that 
were pending review by the Second Circuit.  The imprecision of the measurement does not, however, 
undercut the more general point that it illustrates: the circuit courts review a relatively small percentage 
of district court rulings on motions to dismiss.  
127  It should also be noted that litigants are barred from appealing the denial of a motion to dismiss 
by the Final Judgment Rule, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006), unless they can show that their appeal falls within 
one of the exceptions established by the collateral order doctrine.  See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 
1937, 1946 (2009) (finding that the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss was 
immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine because it “turned on an issue of law and 
rejected the defense of qualified immunity”).   
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generator to select cases.128  Every state within each circuit is represented by 
at least one opinion.129  All selections were made before I read the opinions. 
As I read the selected opinions, I eliminated any cases that involved (1) 
analysis of the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 9(b), which imposes a 
fact pleading standard in cases of fraud or mistake;130 (2) analysis of a Rule 
15 motion to amend the complaint;131 or (3) cases that cite Iqbal for pur-
poses of discussing the doctrine of respondeat superior.132  I then selected 
replacement cases using the random number generator.133  
C. Analysis of the Sample 
The first question addressed by the study was whether the lower courts 
have cited the analytical clarification offered by Iqbal.  After selecting the 
cases, I checked each opinion for a reference to the two-pronged test.134  
Cases that cited the test, either in full or in part, were coded “1.”  Cases that 
did not were coded “0.”   
The second question of the study, whether courts have applied both 
prongs of the analytical test, required a more in-depth reading of each case.  
If the case cited the two-pronged test, I read the court’s opinion to deter-
mine whether or not the court had applied the test and then looked at the 
court’s application of each prong individually.  For the first prong, I looked 
 
128  RANDOM.ORG, http://www.random.org (last visited Oct. 24, 2010) (generating true random 
numbers).  
129  If the sample created by the random number generator did not include a representative of a 
particular state, I discarded the last number on the list and generated a new one.  I repeated this process 
until all states were represented.   
130  FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
131  Id. 15(a).  Although Rule 15(a)(2) urges courts to “freely give leave” to amend a complaint 
“when justice so requires,” courts are not required to allow an amendment if doing so would be futile.  
Many circuits define “futility” as an inability to satisfy the Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standard.  See, e.g., 
Grant W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 175 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The 
standard for assessing futility is the ‘same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under [Federal] Rule 
[of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6).’” (alteration in original) (quoting Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 155 (3d 
Cir. 2000))); Riverview Health Inst. v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir. 2010) (“A 
proposed amendment is futile if the amendment could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” 
(quoting Rose v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 417, 420 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation 
marks omitted))); Lucente v. IBM, 310 F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir. 2002) (“An amendment to a pleading is 
futile if the proposed claim could not withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6).”). 
132  See, e.g., Stanley v. Landers, No. 09-cv-52-PB, 2009 WL 2242676, at *8 (D.N.H. July 23, 
2009). 
133  Because these cases did count toward the total number of cases citing Iqbal (in the Westlaw 
search), however, my sample might encompass slightly more than 10% of the cases citing Iqbal.   
134  The specific quotation is as follows: “[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to 
begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the 
assumption of truth. . . .  When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”  Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). 
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for an explicit delineation of some elements of the claim as “factual allega-
tions” and some as legal conclusions “not entitled to the presumption of 
truth.”135  If the court categorized some allegations as “conclusory” and thus 
not entitled to the assumption of truth or if the court described certain alle-
gations as “factual support” for the elements of the claim, I coded the case 
“1.”  If the court did not explicitly distinguish between “facts” and “legal 
conclusions,” I coded the case “0.” 
For the second prong, I looked for either a reference to a common 
sense evaluation of the remaining factual allegations136 or an application of 
the checklist approach wherein the court matched the remaining facts with 
each element of the claim.137  If the court used either of these approaches to 
evaluate the sufficiency of the factual allegations contained in the com-
plaint, I coded the case “1”; if not, I coded it “0.”  
The third question focused on the substantive clarification of the mean-
ing of “plausibility,” measuring how often courts cited the checklist ap-
proach and the common sense gloss.  The two statements representing the 
checklist approach are:  
(1) “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they 
must be supported by factual allegations”;138  
(2) Rule 8 demands “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation.”139   
 
135  See id.  For examples of courts applying the first prong, see, for example, Boy Blue, Inc. v. 
Zomba Recording, LLC, No. 3:09-CV-483-HEH, 2009 WL 2970794, at *3 (E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 2009), 
stating that “[t]hese allegations are simply sterile legal conclusions that are ‘not entitled to the 
assumption of truth.’  Stripped of such legal incantation, these allegations provide no factual support for 
the remaining elements . . . .” (citation omitted); United States v. Lloyds TSB Bank PLC, 639 F. Supp. 2d 
326, 340–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), stating, “I approach that question by following the Iqbal protocol and first 
identifying those allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the 
presumption of truth. . . .  An example appears in ¶ 6: ‘Lloyds entered into a broad and ongoing 
conspiracy with the primary goals of defrauding AremisSoft . . . .’”; and Estate of Allen v. CCA of Tenn., 
LLC, No. 1:08-cv-0774-SEB-TAB, 2009 WL 2091002, at *2 (S.D. Ind. July 14, 2009), noting that 
“some allegations in the complaint are conclusory and not entitled to the assumption of truth.” 
136  See, e.g., Natural Miracles, Inc. v. Team Nat’l, Inc., No. 09-cv-01379-WDM-KMT, 2009 WL 
3234386, at *3 (D. Colo. Oct. 1, 2009) (“These facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, 
easily support the inference that National disclosed Plaintiff’s formula to Nature’s Blend in violation of 
the non-disclosure agreements and other legal duties.”); FTC v. Innovative Mktg., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 2d 
378, 387 (D. Md. 2009) (“These allegations suggest that D’Souza was deeply involved in a closely-run 
Enterprise, and permit the reasonable inference that D’Souza either had actual knowledge of the 
unlawful conduct, or at least exhibited reckless disregard for the truth.”). 
137  See, e.g., Dewey v. Lauer, No. 08-cv-01734-WYD-KLM, 2009 WL 3234276, at *4 (D. Colo. 
Sept. 30, 2009) (“Because plaintiffs have alleged the nine elements of fraud, I find that they have 
satisfied the first element of mail and wire fraud . . . .”); Fletcher v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 
3:09CV284-HEH, 2009 WL 2067807, at *6 (E.D. Va. July 14, 2009) (“Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint 
falls short of plausibility, however, because it is devoid of any specific factual allegations that similarly 
situated employees, who are not members of a protected class, received more favorable treatment . . . .”). 
138  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 
139  Id. at 1949. 
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The two statements representing the common sense gloss are:  
(1) “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is li-
able for the misconduct alleged”;140  
(2) “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 
will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on 
its judicial experience and common sense.”141  
Citations of each of these statements were tracked separately.  A case was 
coded as “1” if it quoted one of the statements and “0” if it did not. 
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF DATA 
The data lead to three distinct conclusions.  First, the majority of courts 
did not even cite, let alone apply, the two-pronged test offered by Iqbal.  
Second, among the courts that did cite the two-pronged test, the majority 
did not explicitly apply the first prong of the test in their analysis of the suf-
ficiency of the complaint.  Finally, courts cited the common sense gloss on 
the plausibility standard much more often than they cited the checklist ap-
proach.  This Part discusses the results supporting each of these findings 
and then presents a normative analysis of the implications of each. 
A. Lack of Consistent Use of the Two-Pronged Test 
To say that the Iqbal test has been inconsistently utilized might be a bit 
of an understatement.  Overall, less than 50% of the district court cases in 
the sample cited the two-pronged Iqbal test.142  When the data were broken 
down among the circuits, most of the data points fell within the 30%–40% 
range.  Only the Fourth and Tenth Circuits cited the test in more than 50% 
of the sampled cases.143  At this early stage, it appears that Iqbal has only 
generated more confusion over pleading standards because it proposed a 
 
140  Id. 
141  Id. at 1950.  Each of these four statements comes from a different paragraph in the opinion. 
142  To be clear, every case in the sample cited to some portion of the Iqbal decision.  See supra Part 
III.B (explaining method of case selection).  The 50% of cases that did not cite the two-pronged test 
cited different elements of the Court’s explanation of the pleading standard, including the four 
statements tracked in question three of this study.  See infra Part IV.C. 
143  Professor Hatamyar’s study contains an offhand mention that only a few cases in her database 
cited the two-pronged test, but her study did not explicitly track this data.  See Hatamyar, supra note 75, 
at 582 (“Perhaps I am magnifying the importance of the ‘two-pronged approach.’  Only a minority of 
district courts citing Iqbal in the Database I constructed even mentioned the ‘two-pronged approach.’”).  
Hatamyar’s study did not, however, focus on which portions of the Iqbal opinion were relied upon by 
lower courts.  She focused instead on tracking dismissal rates across various areas of substantive law 
under the Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal standards.  See id. at 589–96 (describing how Hatamyar coded the 
cases in her database). 
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test that has been cited by less than half the circuits and has been rigorously 
applied by an even smaller fraction.144 
FIGURE 1: BAR GRAPH OF PERCENTAGE OF CASES CITING TWO-PRONGED 
TEST 















This reluctance to apply the test might change over the coming months 
(or even years), particularly if circuit courts choose to endorse the test.  By 
November 2009, the last month covered by this study’s sample, all but one 
of the circuits had issued opinions that analyzed the Iqbal standard at 
length.145  However, only the Third Circuit mandated the use of the two-
pronged test by lower courts.146  Although it never explicitly ordered district 
courts to apply the test, the Fourth Circuit implicitly endorsed the two-
pronged approach by citing and applying it in two of its decisions.147  Two 
other circuits have issued mixed messages, citing and applying the two-
pronged test in at least one opinion while relying solely on the common 
 
144  See infra Figure 1.  Often, cases simply cited the test at the outset and made no further mention 
of either separating and discarding legal conclusions or determining the plausibility of the remaining 
facts.  See infra Part IV.B.  
145  The First Circuit did not issue its first analysis of the Iqbal pleading standard until December 
2009.  See Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 48–51 (1st Cir. 2009).  The court described the two-
pronged test as a “suggested” approach.  See id. at 49.   
146  See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009).   
147  See Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 256–60 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(citing and stringently applying the two-pronged test); Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193–97 (4th 
Cir. 2009) (citing and applying the two-pronged test without mentioning the “common sense” gloss).  
The Tenth Circuit cited the two-pronged test but noted that the Supreme Court had merely “suggested” 
that lower courts follow this approach.  See Hall v. Witteman, 584 F.3d 859, 863 (10th Cir. 2009). 
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sense gloss in one or more other opinions.148  The remaining circuits have 
not mentioned the two-pronged test and have simply relied on the common 
sense definition of plausibility to guide their decisions.149 
Moreover, it is unclear exactly how much impact circuit court man-
dates actually have on district court judges.  For example, in an opinion is-
sued on August 18, 2009, the Third Circuit clearly told district courts that 
they “should” apply the two-pronged Iqbal test whenever they were called 
to analyze a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.150  Within the 
Third Circuit sample, my study analyzed eleven district court cases decided 
more than ten days after the Court of Appeals issued its opinion.151  Of these 
cases, only five cited the test, and only one rigorously applied it.152   
Although circuit decisions might technically be binding on the district 
courts, lower court judges have a long history of recalcitrance in applying 
the pleading standards designated by appellate courts.  Leatherman v. Tar-
rant County and Swierkiewicz v. Sorema are the best illustrations of this as-
sertion: both cases involved district court judges imposing an artificially 
heightened pleading standard that streamlined the adjudicatory process by 
weeding out obviously unmeritorious claims at the earliest possible stage.153  
The reverse seems to have happened with Iqbal; now that the pendulum of 
the Supreme Court’s pleading jurisprudence has swung in the opposite di-
rection, district courts may fear that a stringent application of the Iqbal test 
would freeze out potentially meritorious claims.  Interestingly, by reverting 
to a more lenient pleading standard, the courts are acting against their own 
interest in reducing their dockets.  The Supreme Court has handed district 
 
148  Within the Second Circuit, compare Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 2010), 
which describes the two-pronged test as “suggested,” with Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 569 (2d Cir. 
2009), which does not cite the two-pronged test.  In the Fifth Circuit, compare Rhodes v. Prince, 360 F. 
App’x 555, 558–60 (5th Cir. 2010), which cites and applies the two-pronged test, with Floyd v. City of 
Kenner, 351 F. App’x 890, 893 (5th Cir. 2009), which cites the “reasonable inference” standard only. 
149  See Waters Edge Living, LLC v. RSUI Indem. Co., 355 F. App’x 318, 323 (11th Cir. 2009); 
Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009); Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 
579 F.3d 603, 609–11 (6th Cir. 2009); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 
2009); Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Brown v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 
334 Fed. App’x 758, 759 (7th Cir. 2009); Atherton v. D.C. Office of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009). 
150  Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210–11. 
151  I omitted one case decided on August 20, 2009, on the assumption that the court had already 
drafted its opinion before the Third Circuit issued its decision.  This case neither cited nor applied the 
Iqbal test.  See Scholz Design Inc. v. Skatell, No. 09cv0896, 2009 WL 2595660 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 
2009).  
152  Goldsmith Assocs. v. Del Frisco’s Rest. Grp., No. 09-1359, 2009 WL 3172752, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 
Oct. 1, 2009) (“Goldsmith’s allegations related to whether the defendant’s enrichment was ‘unjust’ 
constitute the sort of ‘legal conclusion’ or ‘naked assertion’ that must be disregarded under Iqbal. . . .  In 
order to avoid dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim, Goldsmith must allege in its complaint facts 
showing that the defendants specifically requested benefits or misled Goldsmith.”).  
153  See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 509 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. 
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 165 (1993).   
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court judges a massive club with which to pummel all complaints that lack 
sufficient factual support at the pleading stage, and they have instead cho-
sen to use a scalpel to carve out only those claims that are facially implau-
sible or profoundly lacking in factual support. 
Assuming that this infrequent use of the two-pronged test represents 
the beginning of a long-term trend rather than a bit of initial recalcitrance, 
one must ask why district courts would choose not to apply it.  One obvious 
reason is that the test, in practice, might result in overly aggressive screen-
ing at the pleading stage.154  Perhaps the district courts aptly recognize that 
the two-pronged test potentially screens out claims that seem facially suspi-
cious but cannot provide much more than an unadorned accusation because 
the plaintiffs do not have access to the requisite information prior to discov-
ery.  As some scholars have noted, allowing the district courts the flexibility 
to infer potential wrongdoing is absolutely essential to facilitate enforce-
ment of some areas of underlying substantive law.155  In particular, en-
forcement of employment discrimination, constitutional civil rights, and 
conspiracy claims would be particularly difficult if courts insisted on disre-
garding all legal conclusions at the outset.156  If the trend of inconsistent ap-
plication of the test does continue, the question of whether the use of the 
test varies according to the underlying substantive law would be a worth-
while subject for a future empirical study. 
B. Courts’ Failures to Apply Prong One of the Iqbal Test 
The second finding also illustrates that Iqbal’s analytical clarification 
of the pleading standard—its two-pronged test—has not succeeded in insti-
tuting a uniform analytical method for evaluating the sufficiency of plead-
ings.  The first prong of the Iqbal test requires the court to separate “legal 
conclusions” from “factual allegations,” whereas the second step involves 
an analysis of the plausibility of the remaining “factual allegations.”157  The 
data show that even when courts cited the two-pronged test, they often did 
not apply the first prong in their opinions.  Only 51.67% (31 out of 60) of 
the district court opinions that cited the Iqbal test expressly designated cer-
 
154  Judge Alsup opined that “[a] good argument can be made that the Iqbal standard is too 
demanding.  Victims of discrimination and profiling will often not have specific facts to plead without 
the benefit of discovery.  District judges, however, must follow the law as laid down by the Supreme 
Court.”  Ibrahim v. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., No. C 06-00545 WHA, 2009 WL 2246194, at *10 (N.D. 
Cal. July 27, 2009). 
155  See Seiner, supra note 59, at 1043 (proposing a new analytical framework for employment 
discrimination claims to allow plaintiffs the requisite latitude to allege intent). 
156  See Hatamyar, supra note 75, at 607 (finding that the percentage of Rule 12(b)(6) motions 
granted in overall civil rights cases grew from 50% under Conley to 53% under Twombly to 58% under 
Iqbal); Hannon, supra note 121, at 1837 fig.3 (showing an increase in the grant and denial rates of 
12(b)(6) motions in civil rights claims during the time between the Conley and Twombly cases). 
157  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).  See supra Part IV.A. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 428 
tain elements of the claim as “facts” and others as “conclusions” for pur-
poses of conducting the subsequent plausibility analysis.   









All Circuits 159 73 (45.91%) 30 (18.87%) 37 (23.27%) 
1st Circuit 8 3 (37.50%) 2 (25.00%) 4 (50.00%) 
2nd Circuit 25 9 (36.00%) 5 (20.00%) 5 (20.00%) 
3rd Circuit 21 8 (38.10%) 4 (19.04%) 3 (14.29%) 
4th Circuit 11 9 (81.81%) 3 (27.27%) 6 (54.55%) 
5th Circuit 12 4 (33.33%) 1 (8.33%) 1 (8.33%) 
6th Circuit 13 4 (30.76%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (7.69%) 
7th Circuit 14 6 (35.71%) 4 (28.57%) 4 (28.57%) 
8th Circuit 5 1 (20.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 
9th Circuit 26 12 (46.15%) 4 (15.38%) 4 (15.38%) 
10th Circuit 8 6 (75.00%) 3 (37.50%) 3 (37.50%) 
11th Circuit 12 5 (41.67%) 3 (25.00%) 5 (41.67%) 
D.C. Circuit 4 1 (25.00%) 1 (25.00%) 1 (25.00%) 
 
The observed lack of rigor is likely attributable to a number of factors.  
First (and perhaps foremost), after two years of struggling with Twombly, 
judges have likely become accustomed to applying the plausibility standard 
in a holistic manner.  This approach allows the judge to read the complaint 
as a coherent retelling of the events underlying the dispute rather than as a 
laundry list of individual factual allegations carefully isolated from legal 
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language.158  Rigid application of the first prong might actually undermine 
the court’s ability to apply the second, as the removal of the “legal conclu-
sions” linking together the events in question might leave the judge with an 
incomplete picture of the events.  For judges who adjudicate motions to 
dismiss on a regular basis and who have already become comfortable with 
assessing the plausibility of the entire complaint, the imposition of an addi-
tional analytical step likely seems both burdensome and unhelpful.159   
Moreover, judges have likely always tacitly disregarded at least the 
baldest conclusory assertions.  The empirical data from studies of Twombly 
have repeatedly shown that Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal rates under Conley are 
higher than one might expect if courts were applying the “no set of facts” 
standard literally.160  For example, one study found that courts citing Conley 
as the governing pleading standard dismissed 36.8% of the 2212 sampled 
claims.161  The courts issued mixed rulings (granted-in-part and denied-in-
part) in another 29.1% of the sampled cases.162  These studies suggest that 
pleading has always served as a preliminary gatekeeper to weed out poten-
tially frivolous claims.163  Indeed, courts have long recognized that even the 
more lenient notice pleading standard was not intended to allow inherently 
dubious allegations to proceed to discovery simply because the plaintiff 
could dream up some scenario in which the defendant would be liable.164  
Perhaps lower courts have interpreted the first prong of the Iqbal test as a 
mandate to continue to conduct the same level of preliminary screening.   
The much-maligned first prong of the Iqbal test is not helped by the 
fact that it is incredibly difficult to apply in a principled, formalistic man-
ner.  The Iqbal decision itself fails to offer a cogent explanation of why cer-
tain allegations in the complaint were “conclusory” while others were not.165  
 
158  Bone, supra note 15, at 868–69. 
159  Professor Bone agrees and argues that the second prong should be the only component of the 
plausibility test.  See id. at 869.  
160  See, e.g., Hatamyar, supra note 75, at 601 tbl.2 (finding that out of 444 cases citing Conley, 215 
were dismissed and 123 received mixed holdings). 
161  Hannon, supra note 121, at 1835. 
162  Id.; see also Hatamyar, supra note 75, at 601 tbl.2. 
163  See Hatamyar, supra note 75, at 599 (finding, in an empirical analysis of a representative sample 
of federal cases, that courts using the Conley standard granted nearly half (46%) of all motions to 
dismiss); Hannon, supra note 121, at 1835. 
164  See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007) (“[A] good many judges and 
commentators have balked at taking the literal terms of the Conley [‘no set of facts’] passage as a 
pleading standard.”); Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that the 
“exceedingly forgiving attitude toward pleading deficiencies” embodied by Conley v. Gibson “has never 
been taken literally”).  
165  Bone, supra note 15, at 859–62.  The Court dismissed as conclusory the complaint’s allegations 
that Ashcroft was the “principal architect” of the discriminatory policy and that Mueller was 
“instrumental” in its adoption and execution.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009).  These 
are not, however, “legal conclusions” in the traditional sense, particularly when compared to the other 
allegations that the defendants “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject” 
Iqbal to harsh conditions of confinement based on his race, religion, or national origin.  Id.  The latter 
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Scholars have rather cynically posited a reason for that logical omission—
no principled way exists to establish a threshold level of specificity that an 
allegation must reach to be afforded a presumption of truth.166  The “conclu-
sory” nature of an allegation can only be determined in the context of a par-
ticular case,167 and a judicial determination that a particular allegation is 
“conclusory” can be decisive.168  Courts might be uncomfortable applying 
this difficult test to a decision (dismissal of a pleading) with such high 
stakes for both parties. 
Moreover, the “law–fact” distinction was the central reason that the 
drafters of the Federal Rules discarded code pleading in favor of the more 
lenient and accessible standard of Rule 8(a)(2).169  Now, however, the Iqbal 
majority appears to have written that hazy distinction back into federal 
pleading standards.  It is no surprise that courts have been reluctant to em-
brace it.  While it might be relatively easy to toss out an allegation of “neg-
ligence” or “recklessness,” at the margin, the difference is best viewed on a 
continuum rather than as a bright line, formalistic determination.170   
One cannot blame a district court for not wanting to wade into this 
mess.  When faced with one of these marginal cases, the more prudent 
course appears to involve steering clear of the first prong of the Iqbal test 
and relying upon the more holistic plausibility approach undertaken by the 
Twombly court.  This allows the court to evade the equally unattractive op-
tions of either providing tortured reasoning to explain its decision to disre-
gard certain elements as “conclusory” or providing no reasoning 
whatsoever to support the distinction.  It also allows some plaintiffs to pro-
ceed to discovery even if they do not have access to all of the relevant facts 
supporting their claims at the pleading stage. 
                                                                                                                           
statement involves terms that double as elements of the cause of action, while the former do not.  Rather, 
the former allegations implicate the defendants’ actual roles in the events that unfolded in the wake of 
the September 11 attacks.  If we borrow Professor Steinman’s “transactional” definition of a 
nonconclusory allegation—one that describes the overt and visible aspects of the real-world events 
underlying the dispute—these allegations seem to be factual, rather than legal.  Steinman, supra note 26, 
at 1334.  Justice Souter, writing in dissent, agreed that these statements are nonconclusory.  See Iqbal, 
129 S. Ct. at 1961 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
166  Bone, supra note 15, at 861 (“There is no obvious way to draw a line along the generality-
specificity continuum, and the Iqbal majority offers nothing to guide the analysis in a sensible way.”); 
see also Hatamyar, supra note 75, at 566 (“The problem is that one person’s ‘conclusion’ is another 
person’s ‘fact.’”). 
167  Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 492–93 (2010) 
(“Put somewhat differently, what is ‘conclusory’ depends on the right of action on which the claimant 
seeks relief and the conclusions that are necessary to relief under that right of action.”). 
168  Bone, supra note 15, at 861.  
169  See id. at 864 (“Inspired by the legal realist critique and committed to liberalizing pleading 
practice, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure eliminated the code distinction between 
facts and legal conclusions.”). 
170  Hartnett, supra note 167, at 492–93. 
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C. Popularity of Common Sense Gloss on Plausibility  
Thus far, the data show that lower courts have mostly ignored the exis-
tence of the Iqbal test and that even the courts who cited it did not rigor-
ously apply its first prong.  When faced with the combination of this data 
and the wealth of scholarly criticism of the decision, one might think that 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on the 
Twombly version of the plausibility standard.   
The third question of this Note’s empirical study focuses on the Iqbal 
Court’s substantive clarification of the contours of the plausibility standard.  
The decision itself offers two equally viable definitions of plausibility: the 
checklist approach and the common sense gloss.171  The study found that not 
only do more lower courts seem to prefer the common sense gloss to the 
checklist approach but that this gloss has attained widespread acceptance 
across the circuits.  Overall, 68% of the cases cited the common sense 
gloss, as compared to 33% that cited the checklist approach.  Moreover, in 
every circuit except the Third, at least 60% of the cases cited to one or both 
of the statements embodying the common sense gloss.172 
FIGURE 2: COMPARISON OF CHECKLIST APPROACH AND COMMON SENSE 
GLOSS BY CIRCUIT (BY PERCENTAGE) 

















In retrospect, these findings do not seem particularly surprising consid-
ering that judges are certainly accustomed to using their experience to draw 
reasonable inferences from sets of facts.  In fact, judges do so every time 
 
171  See supra Part II.C.  
172  The Appendix to this Note, infra, contains two tables detailing the precise number of times each 
of the four statements was cited. 
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they decide a “hard case” for which there are no precedents directly on 
point.  But Iqbal, and to a lesser extent, Twombly, represent the first time 
that the Supreme Court has declined to impose a rigid (or rigid-sounding) 
pleading standard and instead explicitly asked the lower courts to intuit the 
existence of wrongdoing.  Twombly certainly moved in this direction by 
killing the hyperbolic “no set of facts” language and by examining the facts 
in light of “common economic experience.”173   
Iqbal pushed the standard a little further, explicitly allowing judges to 
account for context when deciding whether a claim is plausible.  The com-
mon sense gloss echoes Professor Stephen Burbank’s suspicion that the 
ambiguity of the Twombly opinion might have been strategically designed 
to empower lower courts to vary pleading requirements based on perceived 
differences in substantive contexts.174  The Iqbal common sense gloss on 
plausibility, particularly when read in isolation from the two-pronged test, 
can be interpreted to do just that. 
Of course, as more skeptical commentators have pointed out, wide-
spread application of such a gloss could send pleading standards careening 
off the cliff of absolute subjectivity.175  Some scholars fear that judges will 
interpret the common sense gloss as a license to apply heightened pleading 
standards, particularly in those areas of substantive law that necessarily en-
tail costly and time-consuming discovery or occupy a large percentage of 
the federal docket.176  Too flexible a pleading standard could allow judges 
effectively to bar the doors to the courthouse, frustrating the enforcement of 
entire areas of substantive law.  Taken to the extreme, a pleading standard 
based entirely on the presiding judge’s common sense might prevent liti-
gants from being able to determine ex ante what level of factual sufficiency 
they will have to provide to survive a motion to dismiss. 
At this point, it is impossible to tell what, if any, effect the widespread 
application of the common sense gloss will have on pleading practice.  To 
be sure, we do not yet have much empirical data on dismissal rates after 
Iqbal.  The limited data analyzed thus far, however, indicate little overall 
change in the number of complaints dismissed without leave to amend.177  
Interestingly, Professor Hatamyar’s study noted a dramatic post-Iqbal jump 
in the number of complaints dismissed with leave to amend, which suggests 
 
173  See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 (2007). 
174  Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 
553–54. 
175  Robert L. Rothman, Twombly and Iqbal: A License to Dismiss, LITIGATION, Spring 2009, at 1, 
2. 
176  See Bone, supra note 15, at 878–79 (noting that the dismissal rates of civil rights claims and 
other cases involving state-of-mind elements have disproportionately increased under Iqbal); Seiner, 
supra note 59, at 1015 (arguing that employment discrimination cases should be reviewed under a spe-
cial pleading standard that would relieve the often-insurmountable burden created by the two-pronged 
Iqbal test). 
177  See, e.g., Hatamyar, supra note 75, at 598 tbl.1. 
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that courts are allowing litigants greater opportunity to adapt to this new 
standard.178   
Judicial “common sense” is a flexible notion, potentially subject to in-
fluence by persuasive advocates.  Twombly can also be read as inviting at-
torneys to present information to change the judge’s opinion of what is 
standard business practice and what is not.179  Thus, while the common 
sense standard almost certainly frustrates attorneys by precluding any pre-
cise rule governing the factual sufficiency of complaints, it can also be in-
terpreted as empowering both lower courts and plaintiffs.   
Common sense also provides for flexibility across various areas of 
substantive law, allowing judges to adjust the specific requirements, or even 
the standards themselves, according to the specific elements of the alleged 
claim.180  As such, courts can adjust requirements for cases in which plain-
tiffs don’t have access to the facts or in cases alleging a state of mind.  
Moreover, judges with different life experiences might view plausibility 
differently than other judges based on their own perceptions of what is rea-
sonable, natural, and commonplace.181  This potential divergence of opin-
ions gives plaintiffs whose claims are dismissed at the trial level a modicum 
of hope in an appeal; the judges on an appellate panel might have a different 
baseline for their common sense and thus might reach a different conclu-
sion.   
CONCLUSION 
This Note undertook a preliminary evaluation of district courts’ inter-
pretations of the federal pleading standard after Iqbal.  The results revealed 
that, far from creating a uniform standard, Iqbal has functioned as a judicial 
Rorschach test, allowing individual judges to pick and choose various dicta 
to create widely divergent pleading standards.  The study found that rela-
tively few (less than 50%) of district courts have applied the two-pronged 
test suggested in Iqbal.  Even fewer courts (approximately 50% of the 
courts that cited the test) rigorously applied both of its prongs.  By far, the 
most popular interpretation of this inkblot of a standard has been a holistic 
approach that rejects formal categories and adopts a common sense gloss on 
the substantive meaning of “plausibility.” 
 
178  Id. at 600. 
179  Hartnett, supra note 167, at 500.  Professor Hartnett notes that in Twombly itself, the Court 
relied on the particular history of the telecommunications industry to determine whether the plaintiffs’ 
allegations were plausible.  Id. at 501. 
180  Id. at 496–97 (noting that plausibility is easier to find in claims of negligence involving car 
accidents or claims of deliberate indifference involving denial of medical treatment than in antitrust). 
181  Id. at 499.  Professor Hartnett notes that four of the five Justices who joined the Iqbal majority 
had experience in the Executive Branch.  Of the four dissenting Justices, only one, Justice Breyer, had 
such experience, and his federal executive experience included service as a special Watergate 
prosecutor.  Id. at 500.  Professor Hartnett then suggests that these experiences shaped the relevant 
Justices’ “common sense” understanding of what is “natural” for a high-level federal executive.  Id. 
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The two-pronged Iqbal test and the Court’s “reasonable inference” 
dicta are somewhat strange bedfellows.  The former is mechanistic and 
rigid, requiring judges to carefully parse complaints to determine which al-
legations merit further analysis.  The latter is fluid, contextual, respectful of 
the fact that judges have ruled on tens, hundreds, maybe thousands of these 
motions and likely have a finely tuned radar for identifying complaints for 
which discovery is likely to uncover supporting evidence.  In retrospect, it 
seems to be no surprise at all that so many judges have used this language 
in their opinions.  
The danger is that the language of the Iqbal opinion sweeps so broadly 
that it can potentially lead to widely divergent interpretations based on the 
judge or judges charged with applying the decision.  This potential for di-
vergent standards makes empirical work like this study absolutely critical 
because only empirical work can help scholars and judges see how the deci-
sion is being interpreted—and how pleading standards are being framed—at 
the ground level.  It also helps litigants to make informed choices on 
whether to challenge the factual sufficiency of complaints or even whether 
to bring complaints at all. 
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APPENDIX  











Overall 159 36 20 4 48 
1st Circuit 8 3 0 0 3 
2nd Circuit 25 7 4 1 9 
3rd Circuit 21 3 2 1 3 
4th Circuit 11 4 1 0 5 
5th Circuit 12 5 4 1 7 
6th Circuit 13 3 2 0 5 
7th Circuit 14 2 0 0 2 
8th Circuit 5 1 1 0 2 
9th Circuit 26 6 4 1 8 
10th Circuit 8 0 2 0 2 
11th Circuit 12 2 0 0 2 
D.C. Circuit 4 0 0 0 0 
 
 
182  MTU referrs to the “more than an unadorned . . . accusation” gloss.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (“[Rule 8] demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation.”); supra Part III.C. 
183  FW refers to the “framework” gloss.  See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (“While legal conclusions can 
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”); supra Part III.C. 
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All Circuits 159 91 51 34 74 
1st Circuit 8 2 4 1 4 
2nd Circuit 25 13 10 8 7 
3rd Circuit 21 11 1 1 10 
4th Circuit 11 10 5 5 5 
5th Circuit 12 9 4 3 7 
6th Circuit 13 7 5 3 6 
7th Circuit 14 9 1 0 10 
8th Circuit 5 2 2 1 2 
9th Circuit 26 12 6 2 14 
10th Circuit 8 5 6 4 3 
11th Circuit 12 7 6 5 3 





184  RI refers to the “reasonable inference” gloss.  See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (2009) (“A claim has 
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”); supra Part III.C. 
185  CS refers to the “context-specific” gloss.  See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (“Determining whether a 
complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing 
court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”); supra Part III.C. 
